Security and trust
Don’t trust us. Check.
Everything on this page is written so that a careful person, or their technical friend, can verify it rather than believe it. Where something isn’t yet verifiable, we say so and give a date.
Last reviewed 18 October 2026.
The policy
No key we hold can move your funds. There is no key we hold.
Every key in your vault belongs to you or to someone you chose. We hold none, and never have: no vault in production has ever contained a key we controlled. Two of the three are required to move Bitcoin, so we cannot produce a signature: not through a bug in our code, not if our servers were taken over, not under a court order.
This isn’t a promise about our behaviour; it’s a property of the vault. You can confirm it yourself: load the descriptor from your Recovery Sheet into Sparrow or Bitcoin Core and look at the three keys. None is ours.
That is a claim about spending, and only about spending. A compromised Keystody could still mislead you, most importantly by showing you the wrong address to pay into. The sections below describe that attack honestly and give you the check that defeats it.
Who holds what
Any two of the three keys spend. Keystody is not one of them.
Key 1
Your device
A hardware wallet you hold.
Key 2
Your device, other maker
So one vendor's mistake can't reach both.
Key 3
Your device from a third maker, or a person you trust
Can help your family or partners recover; cannot spend alone.
Keystody
Public description only
Addresses, balances, key fingerprints. Can watch, remind, coordinate. Cannot sign.
Private keys are created on your hardware wallets and never leave them. Keystody prepares unsigned transactions and hands them to your devices; the signatures come back, and we broadcast the result. At no point does signing material cross into our systems.
If we disappear
No permission, no waiting period.
Your recovery kit holds a standard descriptor and step-by-step instructions for Sparrow; Bitcoin Core can read it too. We have tested this path ourselves and publish the drill date below.
Recover without KeystodyIf our server is compromised
It can lie to you. Your device can’t.
The worst a compromised coordinator can do is show you a wrong address. That’s why every receive address can be confirmed on your hardware wallet’s own screen before the first deposit, and why we tell you never to skip it.
Verify addresses on your deviceIf you stop paying
Nothing locks.
Reminders stop and the app goes read-only. Spending, your keys and your recovery kit never depended on us.
Pricing
What we see
The honest list.
- Never
- Private keys, seed words, device PINs or passphrases. We never ask, on any channel. Anyone who does is not us.
- Yes
- Your vault's public keys and descriptor, so we can derive and watch addresses and verify key checks.
- Consequently
- Addresses, transactions and balances of your vault.
- Encrypted at rest
- Vault metadata is encrypted with keys we control at our cloud provider. This protects against a stolen database, not against us: the running application decrypts it in normal operation.
- Planned
- Keeping your descriptor encrypted with a key only your devices hold, so we see less.
The full account, including log retention and who can read what, is in the detail below.
Independent review
Audited code, published report.
Third-party audit
Being arrangedWe are arranging an independent audit of the code that derives your addresses and builds your transactions, and of the boundary between your devices and our backend. No firm or date is set yet; both will be published here the day they are, and the full report afterwards, including anything it finds.
Open source
PlannedKeystody is not open source today. Open source is not the same as audited, and closed source is not the same as unverifiable: what matters is whether you can check the things that could cost you money, and you can (the addresses you are given, our derivation of them, your ability to recover without us). If we open any part of this, it will be the recovery and verification path first, because that is the code where independent scrutiny is worth most.
Responsible disclosure
Found something? Email security@keystody.com or read the disclosure policy for scope, testing rules and what to expect. We acknowledge reports within three business days, and credit you if you’d like. Machine-readable: /.well-known/security.txt.
Security · changelog
Dated. Public. Including the bad days.
Every change that affects your security, and every incident, with what happened and what we did. Not “last reviewed”; a history.
19 August 2026
First published. Documents the coordinator threat and on-device verification, corrects earlier wording that implied we cannot read wallet metadata at runtime, and publishes the address-derivation check.
11 July 2026
Mainnet recovery completed by hand: a vault exported, rebuilt in third-party software with Keystody closed, and a real transaction broadcast with real Bitcoin.
The detail
The long version, for your technical friend.
Everything above, with the exact wording we stand behind. Each claim is traceable to code, configuration or a test.
Security in detail · 1
How would you know if we were compromised?
This is the question worth asking of any coordination platform, and most do not answer it. Here is ours.
The addresses you see are computed on our servers. A compromised Keystody could not spend from your vault, that needs two of your keys, but it could show you the wrong receive address, or a transaction whose change output goes somewhere else. Nothing on the screen would look unusual.
Your hardware wallet is the check. It holds one of the three keys and re-computes the address from your vault’s full key set, the two-of-three script, not just its own key, on a screen no website can reach. That check is only as good as the key set, so confirm it once. On Ledger the device asks you to approve the vault as a named policy and shows all three keys; on Trezor and air-gapped devices you compare the three fingerprints against your Recovery Sheet yourself. After that, an address matching on both screens is an address your keys control. Before signing, the device should show exactly the payments you intended and nothing else; one unexpected recipient is the attack.
The device settles what an address is. It does not settle whether we are showing you your whole vault; for that, keep your descriptor and check your balance in third-party software now and then (section 4).
Security in detail · 2
What we hold, and who can read it
To show balances and build transactions we store your extended public keys (xpubs), output descriptors, derivation paths, master fingerprints and addresses.
None of this can spend. But together these keys derive every address your vault will ever use, past and future, so anyone holding them can watch your balance and your whole transaction history, permanently: an exposed extended public key cannot be revoked or rotated, only outrun by moving to a new vault. We treat it as sensitive financial data, and you should too.
Encrypted at rest. These fields are encrypted with AWS KMS before they reach the database, with automatic annual key rotation. A stolen database snapshot or backup does not expose them.
Readable by the running application. We want to be precise rather than flattering here: the application decrypts this data in normal operation, because it needs the public wallet metadata to derive addresses and build transactions. So a compromise of the running system is different from a compromise of the database, and would expose wallet metadata. Access to production is restricted and logged.
The current application is configured not to write extended public keys, descriptors, PSBTs or recovery exports to application logs. We state it that way deliberately: it describes how the system is configured today, which we can verify, rather than making a claim about everything the software has ever done.
Bitcoin addresses do appear in operational logs; they are public data, and our sync and support paths need them. Those logs are deleted after 90 days.
We keep three kinds of record, in three different places. Operational logs, the only ones containing addresses, go at 90 days. Authentication events, sign-ins and failed sign-ins, are held separately and also go at 90, because answering “who signed in, from where” is the question a security incident actually turns on. Administrative actions, such as a permission change or a member being removed, live in your account’s audit history for as long as the account does, because that is a record you can inspect.
An address set is linkable even though each address is public, so the length of that window is a real trade-off and we would rather state it than round it down. Ninety days is what an incident reported well after the fact needs: a log that has already expired makes the honest answer to a security question “we cannot tell”.
We do not hand your addresses to a chain-data provider. Watch-only wallets normally query public Electrum servers, which hands a stranger every address in your vault and the IP asking about them. Keystody runs its own Bitcoin node, and on mainnet that is enforced in code rather than configuration; there is no environment variable that can quietly point production at a public server. See section 5.
The limit of that: it covers the queries we make on your behalf. Your addresses are still visible on the public blockchain to anyone who has them, to whoever you transact with, to any block explorer you look them up in yourself, and to anyone holding a copy of your descriptor. Testnet vaults are served by public Electrum servers, not by our node; the protection described here is a mainnet property.
Security in detail · 3
Check our maths yourself
You do not have to take section 1 on faith. Address derivation is deterministic, so anyone can confirm we compute addresses correctly.
This is a throwaway testnet vault, built from test seeds and holding nothing. Its descriptor:
wsh(sortedmulti(2,[075f05fd/48h/1h/0h/2h]tpubDEP6pAW1JoGkLa6Vuoxo4vjVtvaPxXEHcCAnqYAATkgWFaSjrGPFrdFMt2LGNB7zDFwoPTE4UttdGknkvz2R2eTs4HykDhrrhpmz8u9y2HG/0/*,[31353d0b/48h/1h/0h/2h]tpubDFChRDufGVcRBBVqz8UcXhdUXRLAxSSLFpwygPLF35VtFAm2ovgzuT7W9Mrc8T2GVJasVssViefTovS2fXRxunRvyAqTVDDrJHWVUTrfiag/0/*,[f41eddcc/48h/1h/0h/2h]tpubDFi8N9yZYVxtrYNfdLUkiuBQWbKiAGwWphPfGbJD1gNmRC4Kj7tvWzuCzwDvP1JMe6UdUYxqDX91WTifiJugwzMom9AFwb7XYgbHcExbzAy/0/*))#8cnteyj5Copy it as a single line; a descriptor with line breaks in it will not validate. Then run it through Bitcoin Core. No blockchain sync is required; deriving addresses is pure computation:
bitcoind -testnet -maxconnections=0 -daemonbitcoin-cli -testnet deriveaddresses "<descriptor>" "[0,2]"The first three addresses are:
tb1qengd4jssrewfkn4wzyd6u40rq0daufcm06df4dda8aph9alj38cqkx2xgw
tb1qztzvvgtvlw25tarmywh2yqzpctqwsykjr3r8xsral33zsvksrudswrxvza
tb1qrr7peagjqrtk3f70s3mrr29szrdwttzdvsnjqzn7t7g0td6klqzssls7arKeystody derives exactly those, and every build we ship re-runs that comparison. If our derivation ever diverged from the reference implementation, the build would fail before it reached you.
This proves our maths, not our honesty at the moment you look at a screen. That is what your hardware wallet is for (section 1).
Security in detail · 4
If Keystody disappears
Your vault is a standard Bitcoin multisig described by an output descriptor, a public specification, not a Keystody format. Any descriptor-aware wallet can reconstruct it from the file you export, find your funds, and spend them with two of your keys. We are not part of that process.
You do not have to take our word for that, and you should not. Export your vault, rebuild it in Sparrow or Bitcoin Core with Keystody closed, and check the first receive address matches character for character. Then, while nothing is wrong, move a small amount out of the rebuilt wallet. That last step is the one that counts: reconstructing a vault shows the descriptor is well-formed, but only signing shows the key set can actually spend. Both guides are linked below.
Do that once and the answer is yours rather than ours: for your vault, on your hardware, in the version of the software you actually run. And the export you keep is a file: nothing we ship afterwards reaches back and changes it.
What we check on every change. Our address derivation is compared against reference vectors produced by Bitcoin Core v31.1.0, and the build fails if a single address diverges. Bitcoin Core is the reference implementation, so agreeing with it is the standard worth holding ourselves to.
That is address derivation, and only address derivation. It does not test descriptor import into a current wallet release, PSBT construction, hardware-wallet signing, or broadcast. Those are the steps a recovery actually consists of, and no automated check we run today covers them end to end.
What we have tested by hand. A mainnet recovery was completed on 11 July 2026: a vault exported, rebuilt in third-party software with Keystody closed, and a real transaction broadcast with real Bitcoin. Continuous derivation checks validate address correctness, but they do not replace an end-to-end recovery test. Compatibility with current wallet and hardware-wallet versions remains to be re-tested. Sparrow and Bitcoin Core are the two we have tested ourselves; other descriptor-aware wallets should read the format because it is standard, but we will not claim compatibility we have not verified.
The full recovery guide
How to rehearse it while nothing is wrong
Security in detail · 5
Infrastructure
- Hosted on AWS in Frankfurt (eu-central-1). Database, encryption keys and application all run in the EU.
- Encrypted in transit (TLS) and at rest. Field-level encryption with AWS KMS for wallet metadata, with annual key rotation.
- Daily automated database backups, encrypted, retained in the EU.
- Certificate issuance for keystody.com is restricted by CAA records, which instruct certificate authorities not to issue for our domain unless we named them. CAA binds authorities that follow the rules, checked at the moment of issuance; it is not a technical barrier, and it would not stop an authority that ignored it or one that had itself been compromised.
- Authentication through AWS Cognito, with two-factor authentication required, not offered as an option. Until you enrol an authenticator, the API refuses every request for your account.
- Chain data comes from our own Bitcoin node and Electrum server, never a public one. On mainnet this is enforced in code, not configuration. The only outbound third-party call is a block-height cross-check against public explorers to detect an eclipse attack on our own node; it sends a block number and nothing else.
- The marketing site loads one third-party script: cookieless analytics from Plausible, an EU company with servers in Germany. It sets no cookies, stores nothing on your device, and cannot follow you to any other site. It counts page views, clicks on links leading off the site or to the booking form, and form submissions, never what you typed into a form. Fonts are self-hosted and there are no advertising or tracking scripts. The application itself loads no analytics at all; nothing about your vault is ever measured by anyone.
Security in detail · 6
Who processes your data
We use a small number of third parties. There is no Bitcoin data provider on this list; chain data comes from our own node, which is why nobody outside this list ever sees a vault address. The one analytics provider runs on the marketing site only; it is cookieless, and it never touches the application.
Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL
Hosting, database, encryption keys, and transactional email delivery · EU (Frankfurt, eu-central-1)
Stripe Payments Europe, Ltd.
Subscription payments and billing · EU / US
NameHero, LLC
Email hosting for our own mailboxes · US
Calendly LLC
Scheduling calls you book from inside your Keystody account · US
Plausible Insights OÜ
Website analytics for the marketing site only — cookieless, aggregate, never used in the app · EU (Estonia; servers in Germany)
Last reviewed 23 October 2026. We update this list when it changes. Details of what we collect and why are in the Privacy Policy.
Security in detail · 7
If we wind down
If Keystody ceases operating, we will give as much notice as circumstances allow, keep vault exports available throughout that period, and destroy wallet metadata rather than transfer or sell it.
Your ability to recover does not depend on any of that. The descriptor you already hold works without us, which is why we ask you to keep it somewhere safe and offline from the day you set up.
Security in detail · 8
Company and your data
Keystody is an Amsterdam-based service for long-term Bitcoin self-custody. We set up Bitcoin vaults with households and businesses on their own hardware wallets, three keys with any two needed to spend, so responsibility can be shared between family members or partners. The software then tracks when each key is due for a check, prompts the holder to run it on the device, records the result, and shows how ready the household or the business is to recover without us. Keystody holds no key.
ValueActive Solutions B.V., trading as Keystody, Netherlands. Non-custodial software and guidance. We do not hold, trade, exchange or advise on crypto-assets.
Hosted in the EU. No cookies are set by this site; the one analytics script is cookieless and aggregate (section 5). Subprocessors are listed above and in the privacy policy. Deleting your account deletes your vault metadata; your Bitcoin is unaffected.
Have your technical friend read this page.
Then have them load the descriptor from your Recovery Sheet into Sparrow. That’s the test that matters.